

Securing the managed environment

You, me, and everybody



Pepijn Bruienne

  **@bruienne**

R&D Engineer
Duo Security

About Me

- **15+ year as Mac Admin**
 - **Small, medium, large enterprise**
 - **Higher Education**
- **FOSS user, contributor and author**
 - **AutoNBI**
 - **BSDPy**
- **Break Macs for profit**
 - **Protect customers**
 - **Contribute to community**
- **Active contributor**
 - **Slack (macadmins.org)**
 - **Twitter**
 - **Github**
 - **Macadmins.org podcast**



The Problem

The Numbers

Top three failures causing data breaches

95%

Of breaches involved
compromised
credentials

75%

Of breaches involved
compromised
endpoints

26%

Of breaches involved
printers

Source: Verizon 2015 Data Breach Investigations Report







Wait. Printers?

Yes. Printers.


PRET - Printer Exploitation Toolkit
<https://github.com/RUB-NDS/PRET>



The Target



The Goal



Early Conclusion





The Threats

Malware aka APTs

Credential theft

Server attack

Malware/APT

- **Adware**
 - Mostly just annoying, can deliver malware via Flash, leak data
- **Spyware**
 - Records A/V, takes screenshots, keylogging, data exfil
- **Ransomware**
 - Encrypts local/network data and backups
- **Virus/APT**
 - Everything else bad, deliver any of the above


Breach Lifecycle



Credentials

- **Credential bypass**
 - Vulnerable systems
 - Brute force
 - 0-day use
 - No credentials
- **Credential exposure**
 - Phishing
 - Insecure storage
 - Default settings

Credential Compromise




Source: Verizon DBIR 2016 Report

Phishing?




Phishing Basics



It's important to note that email addresses aren't always spoofed. **They don't have to be. Attackers can be tricky and do things like:**

- **Register a similar domain name (example: `account-google.com` as opposed to `google.com` or `rnicrosoft.com` or `payppal.com`)**
- **Use a domain that simply doesn't exist. (Yep! These are almost always delivered just fine.)**

Credential Phishing




Drive-by Phishing



The user opens the email.



The user clicks the link in the email, unknowingly visiting a malicious page with an exploit kit.



The exploit kit compromises the user's out-of-date browser and downloads malware.



Once installed, the malware can steal passwords, install a backdoor or even encrypt the computer (ransomware).


Macro Phishing



The user opens the email and downloads the attachment.



The user opens the attachment and executes the malicious macros.



The macro downloads malware onto the user's computer.



Once installed, the malware can steal passwords, install a backdoor or even encrypt the computer (ransomware).

Server Attack

- **Public-facing service**
 - **Web**
 - **DB/NoSQL**
 - **File share** 🤯
 - **DNS** 🤯 🤯
- **Network gateway/firewall**
- **Any other edge device**

Server Attack Types


- **Accidental Discovery:** An ordinary user stumbles across a functional mistake in your application, just using a web browser, and gains access to privileged information or functionality.
- **Automated Malware:** Programs or scripts, which are searching for known vulnerabilities, and then report them back to a central collection site.
- **The Curious Attacker:** A security researcher or ordinary user, who notices something wrong with the application, and decides to pursue further.

Server Attack Types

- **Script Kiddies:** Common renegades, seeking to compromise or deface applications for collateral gain, notoriety, or a political agenda.
- **The Motivated Attacker:** Potentially, a disgruntled staff member with inside knowledge or a paid professional attacker.
- **Organized Crime:** Criminals seeking high stake payouts, such as cracking e-commerce or corporate banking applications, for financial gain.

NoSQL

Exposed K/V & NoSQL Hosts



NoSQL


Redis RCE + fake ransomware

- **Targets auth-less Redis instance**
- **Wipes existing on-disk datastore (`flushall`)**
- **Creates new key with attacker's pub SSH key**
- **Changes datastore path to `/root/.ssh`**
- **Renames datastore to `authorized_keys`**



**Which of these should
Mac Admins worry about?**


ALL OF THEM





The Managed Environment

The Source



The Managed Environment

Vulnerability vectors

The Managed Environment

Vulnerability vectors

The Cloud

Shadow IT

BYOD

Management tools

The Managed Environment

The Cloud

- **Credential compromise**
- **Code vulnerabilities**
- **Off-site data**
- **Patched too slow**

The Managed Environment

Shadow IT

- **Vulnerabilities**
- **Malware/APT**
- **Data exfiltration**
- **Bypass managed resources**

The Managed Environment

BYOD

- **Malware/APT transmission**
- **Unprotected data**
- **Stored credentials**

The Managed Environment

Management Tools

- **Licensed software theft**
- **No payload verification**
- **Apple management tools**
 - **DEP -> MDM exposure**

Management Tools

Insecure Default Configuration

- **JAMF SSL configuration defaulted to no verification**
- **Allows an attacker to MITM connection**
 - **SSL MITM allows viewing traffic in the clear**
 - **See plaintext XML, settings, passwords**

Management Tools

- **Software deployment compromised**
- **No payload integrity checking performed**
 - **TUF - The Update Framework**
 - **Use multiple keys to validate payloads**
- **Insert replacement payload for existing item**
 - **Now deploys item + APT (as root!)**

Management Tools

DEP to MDM brute-force

- **DEP API *only* requires a valid serial number**
- **Example: run `/usr/libexec/mdmclient dep nag`**
- **DEP API returns MDM config if serial number found**
- **Apple serial numbers can be easily guessed/generated**
- **Guess serial -> send DEP request -> get MDM config**
- **MDM enrollment -> get 🍌**

The Admin

What is their attack surface?

The Admin

- **Access to credentials for many systems**
- **More access than needed (just sudo/yolo it)**
- **Lack full picture of sensitive systems**
- **Imperfect security hygiene**
- **Also vulnerable to phishing!**
- **Password reuse / weak passwords**

The Admin

- **Store shared secrets in a common system**
- **Credentials compromised**
- **Admin access on other systems**
- **Example: Palantír**
 - **Red team gained access to wiki**
 - **Contained JAMF admin credentials**
 - **Rogue payload added**

The Admin

SECURITY NONEXPERTS' TOP ONLINE SAFETY PRACTICES		VS	SECURITY EXPERTS' TOP ONLINE SAFETY PRACTICES	
1. USE ANTIVIRUS SOFTWARE				1. INSTALL SOFTWARE UPDATES
2. USE STRONG PASSWORDS				2. USE UNIQUE PASSWORDS
3. CHANGE PASSWORDS FREQUENTLY			2	3. USE TWO-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION
4. ONLY VISIT WEBSITES THEY KNOW				4. USE STRONG PASSWORDS
5. DON'T SHARE PERSONAL INFORMATION				5. USE A PASSWORD MANAGER

What is U2F?



<https://www.yubico.com/about/background/fido/>

The User

What is their attack surface?

The User

- **Top phishing target**
- **Shadow IT to use tools they want**
- **BYOD to use devices they want**
- **Security hygiene**
 - **Misconceptions**
 - **Lack thereof**

The User

- **Phishing gains access to user**
- **Attacker gains further access by pivoting**
 - **Access internal-only systems/networks**
 - **Use contacts to phish other higher-privileged users, gain access**
 - **Host CNC server for further attacks**

The User

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What's the Solution?

Not The Solution

- **Cycling passwords every month/week/day**
 - **Cycle SSL certs instead**
- **MOAR Antivirus!**
- **Checkbox security is not security**
- **MDM!**
 - **Fancy management tools won't fix bad practices**

The Solution - Managed Environment

- **Don't expose services that don't need it**
- **Leave no default configuration unchecked**
- **Use 2FA where possible - U2F = best**
- **Use PKI for SSH access to servers**
- **Have a testing environment**
- **Demand better from your vendor**

The Solution - Users

- **Educate users on good security hygiene**
 - **Apply updates quickly**
 - **Phishing awareness**
 - **Strong, unique passwords**
 - **Password manager**
 - **2FA (Push, U2F)**
- **Use 2FA? Stop using SMS!**

The Solution - Admins

- **Take your own advice!**
 - Offer software updates quickly
 - Phishing affects you too, more damaging
 - Strong, unique passwords
 - Password manager
 - 2FA (Push, U2F)
- **Use 2FA? Seriously, stop using SMS!**

Conclusion

- **All members of the managed environment are important**
- **Overall security is only as strong as your weakest part**
- **Perfect users + lax admins = 💀**
- **Lax users + perfect admins = 💀**
- **Perfect systems + lax humans = 💀**

Conclusion

- **Point is to make it a lot harder to be breached using simple to follow practices**
- **Rise of phishing = lazy works**
- **Unless you are Google/Facebook/Twitter/GH no one is going to burn a 0-day on you**
- **Implement the top 5 and be 99% more secure than you are now**

Thank you!

<https://seclist.us/pret-printer-exploitation-toolkit.html>

<https://github.com/RUB-NDS/PRET>

<https://duo.com/assets/ebooks/The%20Trouble%20With%20Phishing.pdf>

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Threat_Risk_Modeling

<https://duo.com/blog/why-the-mongodb-ransomware-shouldnt-surprise-anyone>

<https://www.okta.com/blog/2016/09/deploying-jamf-server-software/>

<https://security.googleblog.com/2015/07/new-research-comparing-how-security.html>

<https://www.yubico.com/about/background/fido/>

<https://duo.com/assets/pdf/Scanning%20IPv4%20for%20Free%20Data%20and%20Free%20Shells.pdf>

Questions?